Transmission mechanisms for monetary policy in emerging market economies by Miranda S Goeltom & Bank for International Settlements
BIS Papers No 35  309
 
 
The transmission mechanisms  
of monetary policy in Indonesia 
Miranda S Goeltom
1 
1.  The objective of monetary policy 
A major change in the conduct of monetary policy in Indonesia in the aftermath of the 1997–
2000 crisis was Act no 23/1999 and its revision in Act no 3/2004 that gives Bank Indonesia 
full autonomy in formulating and implementing policies. First, the objective of the central bank 
focuses on achieving and maintaining the stability of the rupiah (currency) value, meaning 
inflation and exchange rate.
2 Second, the central bank has been given independence in 
conducting its monetary policy (ie determining the monetary instrument used in monetary 
management), while the government in coordination with the central bank will set the inflation 
target. Third, the decision on monetary policy rests with the Bank Indonesia’s Board of 
Governors, without any intervention from the government or other parties. And fourth, a clear 
mechanism for accountability and transparency of monetary policy is outlined in the Act, inter 
alia by requiring Bank Indonesia to announce its inflation target and plan of monetary policy 
at the beginning of the year and to provide a quarterly report to the Parliament for its conduct 
of monetary policy. Against the background, we argue that the most suitable framework of 
future monetary policy for Indonesia is inflation targeting. Two fundamental prerequisites for 
inflation targeting – ie, the ability to conduct monetary policy with independence and the 
absence of conflict with other nominal targets or policy objectives – are fulfilled. 
With the mandate of the new Act, Bank Indonesia started to announce its annual inflation 
target and plan of monetary policy at the beginning of 2000. A monthly Board of Governors 
meeting has also been conducted to review and set the monetary policy stance and 
direction.
3 To support the decision-making, the research staff has been charged with 
providing better analysis and forecasts of inflation, economic, and financial trends as well as 
policy scenarios for monetary policy. The results of the meetings have been widely 
communicated to the public through various media, including press releases, press 
conferences, seminars with academicians and other stakeholders, as well as on the Bank’s 
website. In order to fulfill its accountability to the Parliament, quarterly reports have been 
provided to include not only reviews of monetary policy, but also other tasks of Bank 
Indonesia on banking and payment systems.  
It should be emphasized here, however, that the current framework is not a formal framework 
of inflation targeting as adopted by some countries such as the UK and New Zealand. 
Rather, it is simply a monetary policy with an inflation target. But adoption of the full-fledged 
inflation targeting framework started in July 2005.  
Indonesia has undergone a number of far-reaching structural adjustments in all economic 
sectors since the early 1970s. As in many other countries, the adjustments were 
strengthened by faster globalization and have major implications for monetary management 
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and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This paper will discuss the Indonesian 
experience with regard to the macroeconomic environment and policy objective, how the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism works in Indonesia, and the impact of financial 
globalization on the financial market and exchange rate. 
2.  Macroeconomic environment and policy objectives 
It is understood that the macroeconomic environment and structural changes have 
implications for the policy objectives of monetary policy. The monetary policy objectives or 
framework adopted in a country are closely related to the degree of financial development, 
structural adjustment, and the macroeconomic setting in which the monetary policy is 
implemented. In Indonesia, the relationship among the macroeconomic environment, 
structural changes, and the objectives of monetary policy in a broad sense can be divided 
into three periods, namely, before, during, and after the 1997–2000 financial crisis, especially 
as of mid-July 2005, when Bank Indonesia decided to implement an inflation targeting 
framework. 
First is the period before the financial crisis (1969–1996). During this period, the Indonesian 
economic environment was characterized by economic growth that was maintained at the 
reasonable level of around 6% annually, except during the periods 1969–1978 and 1989–
1993 when Indonesia experienced booming economic growth of 7–8% per year. The main 
drivers of the economic growth were agriculture, manufacturing, and mining. The prolonged 
stable economic growth in this period was supported by high commitment of the New Order 
government to an economic management philosophy and objectives laid out in a series of 
five year development plans, which started in 1969/1970. 
The New Order government has been committed to the trilogy of development: growth, 
equity, and stability. For the past 30 years, the government has sought to improve equity 
while promoting growth. This has led to a substantial reduction in poverty and a general 
movement toward an increased degree of income equality. Moreover, in order to attain 
growth and equity, the government has placed a strong emphasis on developing human, as 
well as physical, capital. 
With regard to price development, before the financial crisis inflation could be maintained in 
the single digits (below 10% annually), with the exception of the period of 1974–1978 when 
inflation was quite high, around 15%. Inflation in Indonesia was characterized by high 
inflation on administered prices, especially on food prices, transportation, and other prices 
regulated by the government. On the external side, the balance of payments, especially the 
current account, generally showed a deficit of around 2–3% of GDP. The deficit was the 
result of high import taxes not only on raw materials, but also on machines and other 
mechanical equipment for production. Henceforth, the capital account showed a surplus 
figure for both the government and private sectors.  
The exchange rate was relatively stable due to the adoption of a managed floating exchange 
rate system with a certain band. During the pre-crisis period, there was quite a large 
devaluation of the rupiah in response to relatively significant pressure on the exchange rate. 
The devaluation happened in 1978, 1983 (38% devalued), and 1986. On the fiscal side, the 
government implemented the balanced budget principle. By implementing this principle there 
was always balance between government revenues and expenditure. If a deficit occurred, 
due to government expenditure being bigger than its income the discrepancies would be 
covered by borrowing from abroad (government debt) or by issuing domestic government 
bonds. 
During the stabilization period there were several reforms and structural changes. The 
essential reform in monetary policy started when the credit ceiling was implemented and an 
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credit institution, to control domestic demand, curb domestic inflation, and to attack the deficit 
in the balance of payments. Then, in 1970, the government declared the rupiah to be fully a 
convertible currency (free foreign exchange regime), with no restrictions on the flow of 
foreign exchange into or out of Indonesia. This move was radical at the time and would still 
be considered radical today by some economists. This sequencing reform was primarily 
aimed at attracting foreign capital, especially foreign direct investment, and resulted in the 
appreciation of the rupiah. 
Credit reform began in 1983, when the artificial restrictions on the allocation of bank credit 
and the state bank interest rate were eliminated. Bank Indonesia also reduced its significant 
role in refinancing bank loans and introduced Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI) and money 
market securities issued and endorsed by banks (SBPU). After that, Bank Indonesia adopted 
indirect monetary policy to reduce the supply of reserve money. Under the indirect monetary 
policy, monetary policy transmission is viewed to run from monetary base (operating target) 
through monetary aggregate (intermediate target) to output and inflation (ultimate target). 
An immediate outcome of these reforms was to increase substantially interest rates paid on 
deposits and charges for loans, with an improvement in resource allocation, even though the 
state-owned banks continued to dominate the system. 
Financial sector reform was taken one step further in October 1988 with what was referred to 
as Pakto 88. Under Pakto 88, restrictions on the operations of foreign banks were eased, the 
procedures for establishing branch banks were simplified, and the requirements for 
becoming a foreign exchange bank were relaxed. Pakto 88 also reduced the special 
privileges and responsibilities of the state-owned financial institutions and narrowed the 
differential tax treatment affecting various financial instruments. The bank reserve 
requirement was lowered from 15% to 2% of all deposits, successfully reducing the spread 
between borrowing and lending rates. The re-utilization of the reserve requirement as an 
indirect instrument of monetary policy is intended to control bank credit in the light of the 
surge in capital inflows. In addition, the new provision will strengthen the power of monetary 
policy to influence the banks’ balance sheets. 
The period of financial crisis (1997–2000). The economic and financial crisis in Indonesia, 
which started in mid-1997, has been more severe, prolonged, and difficult to resolve than in 
any other affected country in the region. The crisis, which was triggered by an excessive 
depreciation of the rupiah, resulted in the worst recession the economy has experienced. 
The economy shrank 13.68% during 1998 and the annual rate of inflation reached a very 
high figure, 77.6% in 1998 (year on year basis). This was also followed by several large 
scale bank and business failures and a huge increase in the unemployment rate. 
Meanwhile, the balance of payments was in good condition, with a current account surplus 
as a result of high depreciation of the rupiah, and a capital account surplus, mainly due to 
high repayment of private debts. Unfavorable market sentiment caused excessive exchange 
rate volatility and made it difficult for monetary policy to maintain the stability of the rupiah, 
which had a negative impact on the overall macroeconomic situation. The weakening rupiah 
harmed macroeconomic stability through the pass-through impact on inflation, which led to 
higher interest rates than optimal to support economic and financial stability. Depreciation 
also affected the fiscal deficit, by raising the cost of external debt service as the rupiah value 
of the debt stock exploded. 
To cope with the battered rupiah, the government widened the trading band on the rupiah, 
and also intervened both in forward and spot markets. However, realizing that defending the 
currency was futile under such strong pressure on the rupiah, the government finally let the 
exchange rate float in mid-August 1997. Soon after floating the currency, the government 
adopted an extremely tight money policy by raising interest rates sharply, in addition to 
suspending several monetary instruments which had expansionary effects such as the 
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The high level of interest rates and the large depreciation severely affected the fragile 
banking and real sectors by worsening the banks’ asset quality and contributing to corporate 
failures. To prevent bank runs and a collapse of the entire banking system, Bank Indonesia 
extended huge liquidity support to commercial banks. As a result, broad money and base 
money both grew around 30% from December 1997 to March 1998. As people’s confidence 
in the rupiah eroded, a cycle of weakening currency, soaring prices, and expanding money 
supply threatened to break out in hyperinflation. Bank Indonesia’s main objective was 
therefore to restore confidence in the national currency. Hyperinflation had to be prevented 
and inflation brought down. Bank Indonesia furthermore believed that if prices were 
stabilized, this would in turn strengthen the value of rupiah against other currency. 
To achieve these aims, monetary expansion needed first to be halted and Bank Indonesia 
needed to regain control over its own balance sheet. All sources of central bank money 
creation needed to be under control and Bank Indonesia needed to reabsorb excess liquidity 
in the banking system. Bank Indonesia, with the support of the IMF, pursued a tight money 
policy stance with base money as a target. Quantitative targets were set up at the level of the 
central bank’s balance sheet. Bank Indonesia did not allow domestic assets to expand –
broadly speaking, net domestic assets would also be flat. To protect the foreign asset 
position, a floor was established for net international reserves (NIR).  
To prevent further expansions of liquidity support, in April 1998 Bank Indonesia imposed a 
high penalty on the discount window facility and commercial banks’ negative balance at Bank 
Indonesia. Furthermore, in May 1998 Bank Indonesia placed a ceiling on deposit rates and 
the interbank rate guaranteed by the government. The policy aimed at preventing banks from 
adopting imprudent measures that could lead to self-reinforcing expansion of liquidity 
support. 
Due to a number of constraints in money market instruments such as the thin market of SBIs, 
open market operations were not able to fully absorb all the excess liquidity in the economy. 
To achieve the quantitative target, attempts were made to improve the open market 
operation. On 29 July 1998, Bank Indonesia changed the auction system of SBIs, shifting 
from an interest rate target to a quantitative target. Furthermore, auction participants, 
formerly restricted to primary dealers, were expanded to include bankers, money brokers, the 
capital market, and the general public. These changes were intended to allow greater 
competition among auction participants, hence the SBI rate was expected to better reflect the 
interaction between demand and supply. 
Another innovation in enhancing monetary policy operations was “rupiah intervention”. It is 
set to support monetary restraint and smooth interest rate volatility in the interbank money 
market. Accordingly, rupiah intervention not only served as a contractionary instrument but 
also as an expansionary one. Attempts to control monetary expansion of liquidity support 
originating from government expenditure were also supported by sterilization in the foreign 
exchange market, which simultaneously increased the supply of foreign exchange, thereby 
helping to stabilize the domestic currency. 
Although the framework of monetary policy using base money as the policy target seemed to 
have been effective in the 1980s and early 1990s, the same approach was heavily 
challenged in periods thereafter. There have been concerns that it is difficult for policymakers 
to control M0 growth.
4 Three important factors were allegedly responsible for this problem. 
First, the money markets for SBIs and SBPUs were relatively thin and fragmented. As a 
result, the central bank found it difficult to control the liquidity of the economy using the 
instruments indirectly. Second, in certain periods, M0 was endogenous with respect to 
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output. For example, during periods of “upswing” in the economy, the growth of M0 was 
largely caused by aggregate demand which was reflected by the growth in foreign borrowing 
and liquidation of SBIs. Although this did not necessarily mean that the growth of M0 could 
not be completely controlled, it was a difficult job that sometimes needed an extremely high 
increase in interest rates in order to slow aggregate demand down. Third, the relationship 
between nominal income and money became increasingly unstable. Global financial 
innovation and deregulation had also caused this problem. This in turn made the monetary 
policy with quantity targets less reliable. 
Facing this challenge, Bank Indonesia initially followed a rather pragmatic (eclectic) 
approach. Without leaving the quantity approach, more attention was given to the 
development of interest rates. Moreover, the intervention bands under the managed 
exchange rate regime were widened several times so as to allow some flexibility and ease 
some of the burden on monetary policy. This pragmatic approach was, however, thought to 
be transitory before monetary policy turned to a new approach, ie price (interest rate) 
targeting. However, before the second approach was fully in place, the recent financial crisis 
forced the monetary authority of Indonesia to postpone its implementation and review the 
quantity approach for reasons described below. 
The period of implementing the new monetary policy framework. A major change in the 
conduct of monetary policy in the aftermath of the crisis was the new Bank Indonesia Act that 
gives the Bank full autonomy in formulating and implementing policies. First, the objective of 
the central bank focuses on achieving and maintaining the stability of the rupiah (currency) 
value, meaning inflation and exchange rate.
5 Second, the central bank has been given 
independence in both setting the inflation target (goal independence) and conducting its 
monetary policy (instrument independence).
6 Third, decisions on monetary policy rest on 
Bank Indonesia’s Board of Governors, without any intervention from the government and 
other parties. And fourth, a clear mechanism for accountability and transparency of monetary 
policy is outlined in the Act, requiring, inter alia, Bank Indonesia to announce its inflation 
target and plan of monetary policy at the beginning of the year and to provide a quarterly 
report to the Parliament on its conduct of monetary policy. Against this background, the most 
suitable framework for future monetary policy in Indonesia is inflation targeting. Two 
fundamental prerequisites for inflation targeting – ie, the ability to conduct monetary policy 
with independence and the absence of conflict with other nominal targets or policy 
objectives – are fulfilled. 
With the mandate of the new Act, Bank Indonesia started to announce its annual inflation 
target and plan of monetary policy at the beginning of 2000. A monthly Board of Governors 
meeting has also been conducted to review and set the monetary policy stance and 
direction.
7 To support the decision-making, the research staff have been charged with 
providing better analysis and forecasts of inflation, economic, and financial trends as well as 
policy scenarios for the monetary policy. The results of the meetings have been widely 
communicated to the public through various media, including press releases, press 
conferences, seminars with academicians and other stakeholders, as well as on the Bank’s 
website. To meet Bank Indonesia’s accountability to the Parliament, quarterly reports have 
been provided to include not only a review of monetary policy, but also other tasks of Bank 
Indonesia on banking and payment systems. 
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It should be emphasized here, however, that during the stabilization period under the IMF 
program Bank Indonesia adopted base money as the operational target as well as an anchor 
to achieve the ultimate target. The Bank also monitors various aggregates as well as interest 
rates. Over the long run, however, we noticed a number of shortcomings in the use of base 
money as the operating target, such as the difficulties in achieving the target and the poor 
signal it transmits to the market. Such a poor signal of monetary policy direction and targets 
obviously fails to meet the need to maintain market expectations on future exchange rate 
movements. In view of these factors, Bank Indonesia adopted a fully-fledged inflation 
targeting framework (ITF) in July 2005. 
The framework has three primary characteristics, First, monetary policy is directed towards 
achieving an inflation target explicitly announced to the public for a specified time horizon. In 
this regard, under the new Central Bank Law – as mentioned above – the inflation target is 
set by the government after coordinating with Bank Indonesia. Second, monetary policy must 
be implemented on a forward-looking basis, responding to future developments in inflation. 
At the operational level, Bank Indonesia uses the BI rate as the policy rate to respond to the 
future trend in inflation. The BI rate is implemented through open market operations for 
one-month SBIs, mainly because they have been used as a benchmark by banks and market 
players in Indonesia, they reinforce the signaling of monetary policy response, and they play 
an important role in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
In formulating monetary policy, the Taylor-type rule is used as a benchmark. Thus, in 
essence, interest rates used as monetary policy instruments are adjusted so as to respond to 
deviations in the inflation gap and output gap. Obviously, rules like these are not to be 
applied mechanically. A balance between rules and discretion, or constrained discretion, is 
especially necessary when monetary policy must be pursued within an increasingly 
globalized and complex financial environment. 
The third characteristic of the ITF is that monetary policy is implemented on a transparent 
basis with measured accountability. Inflation targeting is more than a mere framework for 
monetary policy. Inflation targeting promotes the good governance of a central bank. By 
announcing the inflation target to the public, the central bank commits itself to its 
achievement. Uncertainty over future inflation will ease because public expectations have a 
point of reference, thus economic cost arising from uncertainty will also be reduced. 
Communication to the public on the future monetary policy direction is vital so that the public 
can anticipate the central bank monetary policy and to avoid surprises that could trigger 
volatility in the money market. Communications to the market players are also necessary, 
especially when financial markets are experiencing turbulence. In financial markets fraught 
with asymmetric information, the wealth of information held by the central bank is frequently 
of great benefit in mitigating this issue and thus preventing panic and herding by investors. In 
this regard, the credibility of the central bank is crucial. 
3.  Monetary policy transmission mechanism 
3.1  General framework of transmission channel 
In view of the Bank Indonesia mandate to achieve stability in the rupiah, or in this case to 
control inflation, it is vital for Bank Indonesia to have a grasp on how monetary policy 
influences inflation. The monetary policy process that influences the wider economy and 
inflation in particular is known as the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The 
individual channels through which monetary policy operates are known as transmission 
channels. In theory, there are six transmission channels, which are respectively the 
exchange rate, the asset price, the interest rate, the corporate balance sheet, the credit, and 




Summary of transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
 
3.2  Exchange rate channel 
In small open economies, the exchange rate becomes an important channel in transmitting 
monetary policy, in that exchange rate movements significantly influence the development of 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply, and thus output and prices. Its relative strength, of 
course, depends on the exchange rate arrangement of the country. Under a floating 
exchange rate system, for example, an easing monetary policy will depreciate the domestic 
currency, and increase prices of imported goods, thus raising domestic prices even when 
there is no expansion in aggregate demand. Meanwhile, in some countries with a managed 
floating regime, other monetary transmission channels than the exchange rate will have a 
relatively larger effect on real output and prices. Nevertheless, there are cases where the 
exchange rate has room to fluctuate, especially when there is a relatively wide band in a 
managed exchange rate system or if there is an imperfect substitution between domestic and 
foreign assets. In these cases, the exchange rate channel of monetary policy still has an 
influence on output and prices even with a smaller effect and longer time lag.  
This section presents the study of Siswanto, et al (2001) and Astiyah (2006), on exchange 
rate channel of monetary transmission in Indonesia. The channel is decomposed into two 
blocks. The first block seeks to measure whether a monetary policy shock had a dominant 
influence on exchange rate movements compared to a risk factor. Dominance of the policy 
variable shock determines whether the monetary policy could be transmitted to inflation 
through the exchange rate channel. The second block is aimed at detecting the transmission 
of exchange rate changes to the inflation rate both directly, through price (direct pass-
through effect), and indirectly, through output (indirect pass-through effect). The study is 
carried out using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach. Variance 
decompositions measure the monetary policy impact on the exchange rate and inflation, and 




Exchange rate channel framework 
 
The findings from the SVAR analysis reveal that during the pre-crisis period, monetary policy 
transmission through the exchange rate channel was very weak. Monetary authorities’ action 
to maintain exchange rate variability within a certain band had kept the exchange rate 
relatively stable and predictable. Under such conditions, the interest rate on the SBI 
instrument did not have a significant impact on the exchange rate, and the exchange rate 
was not an important determinant of inflation. 
Pre-crisis period 
The study on direct pass-through in this period revealed that a contraction as a monetary 
policy was followed by an increasing interest rate differential after two months, which then 
was followed by an appreciation of the exchange rate to a smaller degree. These responses 
were immediately followed by decreasing tradable goods prices and inflation rate and 
reached a peak at lag 8 before its effect diminished and faded after 25 months. The 
accumulated response of exchange rate and inflation rate to a BI rate shock was very small. 
This suggested that in the period of managed floating, economic agents found the expected 
depreciation easy to predict, so that the impact of the shock to inflation was relatively small. 
Graph 1 
Impulse response to policy rate (SBI) shock 
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Variance decompositions also show a very small contribution of interest rate shocks to 
exchange rate (less than 1%) and inflation rate variability (about 9% in 12 months). The 
variability of the inflation rate was influenced more significantly by tradable goods price 
changes. This proves that during the pre-crisis period under the managed floating system, the 
exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission to the inflation rate was very weak. 
Analysis of the indirect pass-through gave a similar result. The change of monetary policy 
through the SBI rate did not affect the exchange rate. In turn, net exports and GDP growth, 
as well as the inflation rate, were also not significantly affected as their accumulated 
response to an SBI rate shock was very small. Variance decomposition estimates also 
suggest a relatively weak contribution of the SBI shock to the variability of the exchange rate. 
In turn, the impact of an SBI rate shock to the inflation rate through aggregate demand was 
very weak. In the short run, an SBI shock only contributed 0.5% to the inflation rate, while in 
the longer run the relative contribution of an SBI rate shock increased, but only to 10%. This 
indicates that under a managed floating system, monetary transmission through indirect 
pass-through was also very weak, even weaker than through direct pass-through. 
Post-crisis period and recent development 
SVAR estimation of the model in the post-crisis period, and recent developments, reveal that 
the direct pass-through effect of the exchange rate to consumer prices is larger than the 
indirect pass-through. The pass-through effect of exchange rate to inflation varied from 
0.05 to 0.14 (Table 1). However, the indirect pass-through effects are negative, but are lower 
in absolute value than the positive direct pass-through effects. As direct pass-through has a 
higher magnitude than indirect pass-through, a depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange 
rate will reduce (increase) GDP. The relatively high pass-through effect of the exchange rate 
on the domestic economy is related to the high import content of capital goods and raw 
materials in investment and production activity, as well as to the considerable amount of 
external debt (balance-sheet effect). Therefore, at this moment an appreciation of the 
exchange rate is more favorable for the Indonesian economy to boost GDP growth and to 
lessen inflationary pressure. Exchange rate appreciation will bring inflation down through its 
direct pass-through effect on production cost. In addition, the appreciation of the exchange 
rate could generate higher GDP growth through indirect pass-through, as the appreciation 
will encourage consumption and investment. Indeed, at a certain level, exchange rate 
appreciation would support exports of manufacturing products with high import content. 
Table 1 
Exchange rate pass-through coefficients 
Pass-through coefficient 
No Model  Estimation  period 
Direct Indirect  Total 
1.  Quarterly Small Macro (SSM)  1987:Q1–2001:Q3  0.1695  –0.0570  0.1122 
2.  Quarterly Modified Small Macro 
(SSM-Mod) 1991:Q4–2001:Q4  0.0960  –0.0127  0.0833 
3.  Quarterly Medium Scale Macro 
(SOFIE) 1983:Q1–2000:Q4  0.1567  –0.0186  0.1380 
4.  Yearly Medium Scale Macro 
(MODBI)  1970–1997 0.3458  –0.2164  0.1294 
5.  Quarterly Single Equation  1996:Q1–2000:Q2      0.1405 
6.  Monthly Single Equation  1990:M8–2002:M7      0.0564 
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More understanding of the behavior of the more flexible exchange rate regime adopted since 
August 1997 by economic agents has helped stabilize the exchange rate. Markets are beginning 
to establish a “band” to cushion the movement of rupiah exchange rate fluctuation in their daily 
activities. Exchange rate volatility has shown a decreasing trend for the last two years. 
Graph 2 
Exchange rate and volatility 
 
Empirically, this is also seen in the discrepancy between the movements in the wholesale 
price index, the consumer price index, and the rupiah exchange rate (Graphs 3 and 4). 
Contrary to its historical data, the exchange rate movement is not transmitted as large as its 
coefficient estimation to the inflation rate. For example, only part of rupiah exchange rate 
depreciation in 2005 was transmitted to inflation. The hike in inflation was predominantly 
explained by the increase in domestic fuel prices and not the depreciation of the currency. 
Graph 3  Graph 4 
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Considering the impact of exchange rate movement on the price formation mechanism 
(inflation), Bank Indonesia has developed an exchange rate model using the Behavioral 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach since 1999. This model focuses on the actual 
path of the real exchange rate and forecasts this path for one year ahead. There are five 
variables in this model: three long-run (fundamental) variables, namely the terms of trade 
(TOT), the relative price of non-traded to traded goods (TNT), and net foreign assets (NFA), 
and two short-run variables, namely the risk premium and the interest rate differential. All 
variables have a positive relationship with the real exchange rate, such that an increase in 
those variables will be followed by a real exchange rate appreciation and a decline in those 
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Recent research on the BEER model (Budiman, Hendarsah, Nugroho, Sylviani (2002)) 
showed that among those variables that significantly affect the exchange rate, the risk 
premium had the highest coefficient. This result was different from previous research 
(Kurniati, Hardiyanto (1999)) which, using the same approach, found that the long-run 
variable, TNT, dominated the movement of the real exchange rate. As the risk premium has 
become an important factor in exchange rate movement, the assessment of risk premium 
indicators was improved by conducting a market expectations survey to form a risk 
composite index, thus reflecting market perception on Indonesia’s country risk.  
On the micro side, Bank Indonesia has developed and implemented an on-line monitoring 
system of foreign exchange to complement the macro model of the exchange rate. First, an 
International Transaction Reporting System (LLD) was developed in 2000 to improve 
understanding of the nature and magnitude of foreign exchange transactions involving banks, 
non-bank financial institutions, companies, and individuals. Second, the on-line analytical 
processing (OLAP) system was built in 2002 to monitor daily foreign exchange transactions in 
domestic market. The systems help Bank Indonesia to identify the sources of exchange rate 
fluctuation and take appropriate measures to avoid further fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
3.3  Asset price channel 
As is well known, asset price movements contain some information about future economic 
conditions as well as the future path of inflation. While these properties are true for some 
countries, they do not necessarily hold for others. Before the crisis, the role of asset prices in 
the transmission mechanism in Indonesia was not particularly strong or clear. In fact, there 
was no relationship between asset prices and the economy. Nevertheless, curiosity about 
the role of asset prices in monetary policy transmission mechanism continues to grow. Bank 
Indonesia, as the authority in conducting monetary policy, places special emphasis on this 
transmission mechanism and reviews it on a regular basis. Rapid changes in the economic 
structure after the crisis struck led to ongoing reexamination of the transmission mechanism. 
Figure 2 
Assets price channel 
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A study by Idris, et al employs VAR models with some structural restrictions. While housing 
or land prices would have been the best proxy for asset price data, constraints prompted the 
use of the Jakarta Composite Stock Price Index (JSX). For the pre-crisis period the study 
concludes that there is no strong evidence on the existence of the asset price channel of 
monetary transmission in Indonesia. For the post-crisis period up to recently, the study 
indicated that the asset price channel strongly transmits monetary policy through its impact 
on investment. 
Estimate and variance decomposition of investment path 
The study reveals that each parameter has the correct sign as predicted by economic theory, 
but is statistically not significant. The coefficient on the SBI rate in the JSX equation reflects 
the monetary policy impact on the JSX index. When Bank Indonesia raises the SBI rate, the 
deposit rate will rise and people prefer to put their money in the bank. Thus, demand for JSX 
as an alternative for people to hold their wealth decreases and the JSX index goes down. 
Moreover, it indicates the existence of a substitution effect. This result also holds for other 
sample periods, except for the post-crisis period. Although these coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero, they suggest that monetary policy affects the movement of 
the JSX index. 
The coefficient on SBI in the investment equation for the pre- and post-crisis periods has a 
negative sign and is statistically significant for post-crisis. This result is consistent with 
economic theory. Increasing the SBI rate implies a higher cost of investment, therefore 
discouraging investment. On the contrary, when the policy rate is reduced, that will push 
activities on the stock market. Estimates of the investment equation reveal that the increase 
in the JSX index leads to higher investment. Our result shows that the JSX index is positively 
related to investment in all sample periods, as hypothesized. However, the relationship is 
significant in explaining the asset price channel.  
Model estimates indicate that an increase in investment will cause inflation, representing 
potential inflationary pressure. This phenomenon does not appear in the post-crisis period, 
when investment is negatively related to inflation and this is statistically significant. However, 
in the full sample and the pre-crisis period we find that investment could be inflationary, but it 
is not clear because the relationship of investment to inflation is statistically insignificant. It 
appears that the parameter estimates are not robust to explain the existence of the asset 
price channel. We put inflation variables into the JSX index equation in order to describe the 
phenomenon where people prefer to hold their wealth in assets at times of higher inflation, 
and vice versa. Higher inflation implies that it is more profitable to hold assets rather than 
cash or deposits.  
Variance decompositions for investment, which quantify the percentage contribution of each 
shock to the variation in each variable, reveal that the variances are mostly determined by 
their own shocks. The variability of the JSX index due to a shock in SBI increases to 34% at 
36 months after the shock in the pre-crisis period. Meanwhile, in the post-crisis period, the 
contribution of SBI drops to less than 25%. This indicates that monetary policy became less 
dominant in determining the variability of the JSX index in the post-crisis period. It appears 
that the movement of JSX is not only influenced by the policy rate but also affected by 
several other non-economic factors, such as global excess liquidity and political and social 
conditions surrounding Indonesia, which play more important roles in all activity, despite 
some possibilities of excluding the relevant variables from the model. 
Impulse responses for the investment path to JSX only need five months for the pre-crisis 
period and are faster in the post-crisis period. These results suggest that monetary policy 
can affect the JSX index within the first five months, after which the impact starts to diminish. 
The impulse responses from the whole period 1 and 2 also appear to have similar results. BIS Papers No 35  321
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Meanwhile, investment does not respond immediately to the monetary policy shock. It takes 
approximately 10 months before the shock affects investment in the right direction in the 
pre-crisis period. A similar result appears in the post-crisis period, but with a more rapid and 
stronger response. It takes only five months before the monetary policy shock has its impact. 
Afterwards the effect is diluted. In general, this particular shock does affect investment in the 
right direction in all sample periods, except for the pre-crisis period. 
The response of inflation to tighter monetary policy occurs with a lag. The full impact takes 
15–20 months after monetary contraction. The result is in line with previous research 
regarding the lag of the response of inflation to monetary policy, which is between 18 and 
24 months. However, the first response to the shock is to increase inflation. Thus, we can 
hardly say that SBI can lower inflation through this particular path. 
Estimate and variance decomposition of consumption path 
Estimate for consumption path. The coefficient on the  SBI rate in the consumption 
equation has an insignificant negative sign, indicating that the contemporaneous substitution 
effect dominates the income effect. In other words, relatively higher returns from deposits 
could discourage spending for consumption. However, in the post-crisis period, the reverse 
result appears. During the crisis, higher consumption mainly came from windfall income 
resulting from increasing returns on deposits and fiscal expansion. Moreover, during the 
crisis period, growth was led by consumption. 
The coefficient on JSX in the consumption equation indicates that an increase in the JSX 
index leads to higher consumption. However, the relationship is statistically insignificant. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient on consumption indicates that increasing consumption leads to 
higher inflation. This phenomenon appears in the post-crisis period, but in other sample 
periods the reverse is found. As stated earlier, consumption was the main engine of growth 
during the crisis, while investment dropped severely. The net result was a narrowing output 
gap, which led to an increase in general price levels. 
The variance decomposition in this particular path shows that the variability of each variable 
is also mainly attributable to its own shock. The contribution of a shock in SBI variability in 
inflation is 8% in the pre-crisis period, and jumps to almost 40% after the crisis. In the pre-
crisis period, the share of the SBI shock accounts for more than 40% of the variability of the 
JSX index. However, for other sample periods, the share of SBI shock is less than 11%. 
Substantial drops in the SBI contribution are due to the fact that the JSX index fluctuates 
almost independently from economic fundamentals. In other words, business 
decision-making was determined more by non-economic factors such as negative market 
sentiment, political upheaval, uncertainties in law enforcement, etc. 322  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
The impulse response of JSX to an SBI shock is quite similar to that resulting from the 
investment path. An SBI shock leads to the fall in the JSX index and reached its maximum 
impact within six months in the pre-crisis period. Meanwhile, in the post-crisis period, the 
impact of an SBI shock is not significant compared to the previous sample period. As 
mentioned earlier, those non-economic factors play an important role in the post-crisis period 
in determining the fluctuation of the JSX index. This suggests that monetary policy is less 
dominant in affecting the JSX index. 
In the pre-crisis period, an SBI shock results in an immediate increase in consumption. But 
after three months, consumption starts to decrease as expected, and then the impact is fully 
reversed after 14 months. This pattern does not hold for other sample periods. Instead of 
experiencing an increase, consumption drops right after the shock and is fully reversed after 
approximately 25 months. More time is needed to fully reverse the impact of an SBI shock. 
This indicates the longer impact of monetary policy lingers in affecting the consumption 
pattern. Furthermore, a positive shock in monetary policy is unexpectedly followed by an 
increase in inflation, and fully reversed after 15 months. This pattern holds for all sample 
periods. It reflects once again that monetary policy cannot influence inflation as theory 
suggested. 
Evidence from survey 
The Household Assets Survey shows that over 33% of respondents choose bank deposits as 
their first priority to place their funds. Bank deposits are regarded as the most liquid asset, 
yet still provide quite attractive returns. Other investment alternatives are in land and 
housing; 29% and 28% of respondents respectively choose those assets as their first priority. 
Despite being not as liquid, housing and land have a long history of being a safe haven for 
long-term investment. On the other hand, only 1% of household respondents place their 
funds in stock as their first priority. 
In line with this result, should respondents have additional funds, the order of preference is 
similar, except for those of land and housing. Bank deposits are preferred by 38% of 
respondents, while 36% and 18% of respondents chose housing and land respectively. 
Meanwhile, stocks are chosen as the prime priority only by 3% of respondents. This 
evidence fortifies our empirical results that stocks are not a good proxy for household wealth 
in Indonesia. 
According to the survey, the majority of respondents (83%) are not responsive to a decrease 
in bank deposit rates. Over 80% of respondents will not withdraw their deposits unless the 
deposit rate decreases substantially. Furthermore, 60% of respondents will not withdraw their 
deposit even if the interest rate falls to 10%. We suspect this occurs because the majority of 
respondents spend a total of Rp 1 million to Rp 3 million each month. Consequently, they are 
relatively insensitive to changes in bank deposit rates. With regard to alternatives for fund 
placement, the survey suggests that over 37% of respondents place their withdrawn money 
in investment goods, 24% prefer to hold cash, and 18% prefer to buy foreign exchange. In 
contrast, only 10% of respondents use the withdrawn money for consumption purposes. Out 
of the 37% respondents that place their money in investment goods, 51% invest in land, 26% 
in housing, and only 7% in stocks. 
Decreasing interest rates on bank deposits lower the cost return from deposits compared to 
other assets. Thus, the majority of respondents react by looking for investment alternatives 
with higher returns. The figure below identifies that land is the preferred alternative for 
respondents to hold their assets. This to some extent reflects the existence of a substitution 
effect. Meanwhile, if the deposit rate increases, 74% of respondents increase the amount of 
money in bank deposits, while 8% counter by enhancing their investments, and only 6% 
respond by reducing their purchases of investment goods. 
The majority of respondents (72%) will also put the income generated from an increase in the 
deposit rate into bank deposits. 15% of respondents use their income for consumption BIS Papers No 35  323
 
 
purposes, and only 8% utilize their additional income to purchase land and housing. This 
shows that the income effect does not exist in this particular sample group. Furthermore, 
respondents need a substantial increase in the bank deposit rate before they place additional 
funds. Almost 80% of respondents require an increase in the deposit rate of more than 4%. 
All of these findings imply that households do not respond much to a change in the bank 
deposit rate. Should they withdraw their funds, they put their money in traditional investment 
alternatives, ie land and housing. 
3.4  Interest rate channel 
The monetary transmission mechanism through the interest rate channel starts from a 
change in the short-term interest rate, which will then be transmitted to all medium- and long-
term interest rates through the balancing mechanism of supply and demand in financial 
markets. The change in the short-term nominal interest rate set by the central bank can 
induce changes in real short- and long-term interest rates. If prices are sticky, an 
expansionary monetary policy will drive down the short-term real interest rate. Subsequently, 
with the expectations hypothesis of term structure, which states that long-run real interest 
rate is the average of expectations of future short-term interest rates, the lower short-term 
real interest rate will cause a decrease in the long-term real interest rate. All these 
movements are expected to influence price variables in the financial market, real sector 
variables, and finally, inflation. 
Kusmiarso, et al (2001) and Astiyah (2005) conducted analyses to see how the cost of 
capital, substitution effects, and income effects transmit the change in interest rate as a 
result of monetary policy. The relationship of the policy rate and real sector variables is 
investigated using the Granger test and VAR analysis. Furthermore, to have a deeper 
understanding of bank behavior in responding to the policy rate, several structural equations 
are also introduced, involving several micro factors on banks, ie the inter-bank overnight rate, 
deposit rate, and credit rate. 
Pre-crisis period 
Empirical evidence from the VAR analysis reveals that before the crisis, the real deposit rate 
and real investment credit rate were strongly influenced by the inter-bank rate. Investment 
growth, however, was influenced more by the high access to foreign borrowing than the real 
investment credit rate. Similarly, consumption growth was not significantly affected by 
changes in the real deposit rate, as the real deposit rate was relatively stable and low.  
The structural models provide further evidence on the behavior of bank interest rates, 
especially the inter-bank rate, time deposit rate, and working capital credit rate. For the 
interbank interest rate, the central bank certificate (SBI) rate and bank liquidity have been the 
dominant factors in both the pre- and post-crisis periods, with a stronger impact by the SBI 
rate in the post-crisis period. Bank liquidity becomes relevant in determining the inter-bank 
interest rate for private national foreign exchange banks, private national non-foreign 
exchange banks, and regional development banks. However, liquidity is not a significant 
factor for state-owned banks, nor for foreign and joint-venture banks, as they have more 
access to funding. 
The study reveals that the impact of the policy rate was faster in influencing the loan rate 
(within three months) than the deposit rate (within six months). The behavior is related to the 
fact that deposit rate represents banks’ cost while the loan rate represents banks’ revenue. 
The response and its direction of each variable in the VAR system show that during the 
pre-crisis period, the cost of capital worked well in transmitting monetary policy using the 
interest rate. This is explainable as during that period the banking and real sectors were still 
in normal circumstances, hence they could give proportional responses to the central bank 
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The real investment loan rate was also responsive during the pre-crisis period as the 
economy was booming and more funds were needed by the business sector. The weaker 
responses of the real investment loan rate after the crisis were caused by the negative return 
as inflation jumped to a much higher level, and banks’ concerns about debtor default. Those 
factors make the non-price factors become stronger in influencing bank lending. 
Post-crisis period 
After the crisis, the real deposit rate and real investment credit rate response to the inter-
bank rate was weaker as compared to the pre-crisis period. The increase of the inter-bank 
rate following the monetary shock was followed by an increase in the one-month deposit real 
interest rate with a smaller magnitude until the second month. Meanwhile, the increase of the 
inter-bank rate was initially followed by a negative growth of consumption for the same 
period. The real investment credit rate, however, does not correspond proportionately to 
changes in the real deposit rate because of banks’ concern that a higher interest rate will 
lead to higher debtor default and non-performing loans. Investment growth has been 
significantly influenced by the real investment credit rate. Likewise, consumption growth has 
been significantly driven by the real deposit rate. 
The real sector has responded significantly to the banking interest rate after the crisis period. 
Investment growth has responded more strongly as compared to the pre-crisis period to the 
real investment loan rate because investors have limited access to other sources of financing 
from domestic financing, ie credit from banks, from offshore borrowing and from other 
sources such as high-risk paper. The negative return leads to banking sector reluctance to 
disburse new credit. The existing credit is disbursed on the basis of long-term relationships, 
because after the crisis most sectors bear higher risk. Meanwhile, in the pre-crisis period, 
investors had high access to offshore borrowing. Consequently, investment growth was 
weakly influenced by the change in the real investment loan rate. 
Consumption growth has been influenced significantly by changes in the inter-bank interest 
rate in the post-crisis period. The increase of the inter-bank interest rate was initially followed 
by negative growth in consumption, showing the presence of a substitution effect. However, 
when the deposit real rate started to decrease, household consumption also decreased with 
a lag indicating the presence of income effects. 
The inter-bank rate, liquidity and its lag determine the time deposit rate. The time deposit rate 
responds to movement of the inter-bank rate, with the role of the inter-bank rate increasing 
after the crisis. Since the crisis, banks have been relatively liquid. The loan to deposit ratio (a 
proxy for liquidity) does not significantly influence the deposit rate, as all groups of banks are 
unwilling to lend money. 
The time deposit rate and the liquidity condition are two determinants of bank behavior in 
determining the working capital credit rate. Liquidity has become a relevant factor for the loan 
rate in the post-crisis period as banks have limited access to funding. For non-foreign 
exchange domestic private banks, however, liquidity has been significant in all periods, 
because of their limited access to foreign funds and their relatively small asset size. On the 
other hand, liquidity never becomes a problem for foreign and joint-venture banks in 
determination of the loan rate as they have perfect capital mobility. 
Evidence from survey 
A survey of banks, households, and companies was conducted to investigate the response 
of the banking and real sectors to changes in the interest rate. The findings confirmed the 
preceding results. In particular, during the post-crisis period a change in the policy rate is 
transmitted to various retail-banking rates and to the real sector. The loan rate is determined 
by the deposit rate, borrowers’ risk and the SBI rate. There is a significant bank response to 
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and portfolio holdings of SBI, and then increase their loan portfolios especially for working 
capital loans. In addition, banks tend to raise their loan rates and reduce their loan portfolios 
in the case of tight liquidity or a significant increase in the SBI rate.  
The survey also reveals that the household decision to save is influenced by the interest rate. 
However, slightly different from the empirical finding, households maintain their saving rate 
even if there is a decline in the deposit interest rate, because of the presence of a 
government guarantee scheme on deposits. Similarly, households maintain their saving rate 
when the interest rate rises as they prefer to add to their deposit instead of spending for 
consumption. Finally, a firm level survey confirms the empirical finding that the growth of 
investment is not strongly related to movements in the credit rate. In the event of a rising 
policy rate, most companies choose to place their funds into their deposits with banks and 
reduce their loan demand. This is explicable by the fact that most respondents will turn to 
own funds for financing their business activities while others postpone their plans for 
expansion. The response becomes more pronounced if companies perceive that business 
prospects have become bleak and unprofitable. 
3.5  Bank lending channel 
There is widespread agreement among economists that banks or financial intermediaries 
have generally played an important role in transmitting monetary policy to the real economy. 
But the precise role of banks is still debated. In the standard view, known as the money or 
interest rate channel, banks play a special role on the liabilities side, ie, the banking system 
creates money (liquidity) by issuing deposits and plays no role on the assets side. In a 
monetary contraction, bank reserves decrease and, due to reserve requirements, the ability 
of banks to issue deposits is constrained. As a result, depositors hold less money (bank 
deposits) in their portfolios. If prices are sticky, real money balances will fall and both short-
term and (through expectation effects) long-term interest rates will rise. Accordingly, demand 
for loans, investments and interest-sensitive spending such as housing all fall. So, three 
crucial conditions that must be satisfied for the existence of a money channel are: (1) prices 
must be sticky so that monetary policy can affect real money balances; (2) short-term interest 
rates must influence long-term interest rates; and (3) long-term interest rates must influence 
real investment expenditure. 
The study utilizes a battery of tests to analyze the bank lending channel. It employs a vector 
autoregression VAR approach using aggregate and disaggregated data to see the effects of 
monetary policy on bank balance sheets. With disaggregated data, hypotheses underlying 
the bank lending channel can be analyzed. Complementary to the VAR analysis, long-run 
demands and supply equations of the Indonesian credit market are estimated, derived from a 
vector error correction model (VECM) in order to identify whether adjustment towards 
equilibrium in the credit market is dominated by supply, as suggested by the lending channel.  
Overall, the study provides a comprehensive investigation on the existence of the bank 
lending channel of monetary transmission in Indonesia before and after the crisis. Given the 
existence of “bank dependent borrowers” as the secondary condition of the bank lending 
channel clearly satisfied, the study particularly focuses on the first condition for existence of 
the bank lending channel; that is, whether monetary policy affects the quantity of bank 
lending.  
According to the “bank lending” (Bernanke and Blinder (1988)) monetary transmission 
mechanism, banks’ assets as well as their liabilities play an important role. In a monetary 
contraction, banks’ reserves decrease and given reserve requirements, their deposits fall. If 
the decrease in deposits is not offset by other funds which are not subject to reserve 
requirements, or by a decrease in securities, this will result in a decrease in bank loans. If 
bank loans fall and bank dependent borrowers are dominant in the economy, real investment 
expenditure will diminish. Since bank loans in many countries, especially developing 
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of bank loan supply can reduce economic activity. The necessary conditions for the 
existence of this channel are: (1) the central bank must be able to constrain the supply of 
bank loans; and (2) bank loans and securities must be imperfect substitutes for some 
borrowers. 
Agung (1998) uses the money market interest rate (interbank money market) as the 
monetary policy variable by arguing that Bank Indonesia often indirectly targets interbank 
interest rates. An alternative is the SBI rates which have been widely used as the benchmark 
by the market, in particular since banks’ holdings of SBIs increased dramatically. The 
problem with using the SBI rates is that the auction system has been changed three times. 
Before 1993, Bank Indonesia targeted the quantity of SBIs in the auction (cut-off rate), but 
since 1993 the system was changed to the stop-out rate, in which the monetary authority 
sets the interest rates on SBIs and the market determines the quantity of SBIs. The stop-out 
rate system was changed again into the cutoff rate in 1998. In practice, however, a mix of 
price and quantity targets has been frequently executed. Another alternative is base money, 
which has formally been used by Bank Indonesia as the operating target since 1998.  
Pre-crisis period 
Before the crisis, bank lending was almost not affected by tight monetary policy. This result is 
consistent with findings by Agung (1998) who also uses pre-crisis data. One reasonable 
explanation of the low sensitivity of lending to a monetary shock is that before the crisis, 
especially since the beginning of the 1990s, the access of domestic commercial banks to 
international sources of funds was relatively easy. Hence, in spite of tight money, banks 
could still provide loans to their borrowers. A survey conducted by Hadad (1996) also found a 
similar phenomenon. During the tight money period (eg in the aftermath of the so-called 
Gebrakan Sumarlin), the loan growth of state banks and large private banks was higher than 
their deposit growth. In fact, domestic banks were major issuers of bonds in international 
markets during the period. Large banks obviously have better credit ratings than smaller 
ones and are thus able to raise funds less expensively. This differential behavior of state and 
private banks is clearly reflected in the fact that loans of state banks are completely 
insensitive to a monetary shock, while those of private banks are more sensitive. 
Post-crisis period 
The relatively high sensitivity of commercial bank lending for the whole sample is partly 
influenced by the behavior of bank lending during and after the crisis. Given the weakening 
of firms’ balance sheets amidst low economic prospects, a monetary tightening worsens 
firms’ financial position and raises the probability of default, and hence reduces the 
willingness of banks to lend. This is consistent with a recent study by Agung et al (2001), 
who found the existence of “credit crunch” in the aftermath of the crisis. Under such 
circumstances, they argue, tight money exacerbates the unwillingness of banks to lend. This 
is also confirmed by a study on the balance sheet channel that concludes that there is a 
financial accelerator effect of monetary policy, especially after the crisis. Similar impulse 
responses are obtained if we use the PUAB rate as the policy variable, although the effect of 
a change in the SBI rate seems to be more pronounced than a change in the PUAB rate. 
The lag of bank lending to a shock can be attributed to the fact that bank loans (especially 
investment loans) are mostly supplied on a loan commitment basis, instead of on a project or 
fixed-term basis. Under such a commitment, banks allow borrowers to draw down a line of 
credit at their discretion, and borrowers pay a fee for the credit line and pay interest on the 
actual loans that have been drawn. As a result of this system, banks cannot prevent 
borrowers from drawing credit even when monetary conditions are tightened. Banks can only 
reduce the supply of new loans, which presumably does not immediately lead to a 
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A disaggregation of total bank loans into corporate lending and individual (household) 
lending, however, suggests that the insignificant response of aggregate lending stems from 
the loans to firms. By contrast, loans for individuals drop significantly in the aftermath of a 
monetary shock. This may be explained by the so-called “flight to quality” phenomenon. That 
is, in a monetary contraction, to compensate for the decline in cash flow, creditworthy 
borrowers have access to short-term loans, while loans to less creditworthy borrowers such 
as individuals or small firms will be rationed. 
Evidence from survey 
This section presents an analysis based on a survey of banks and firms. The survey is 
designed to generate answers to some important questions on the behavior of banks and 
firms in the aftermath of a monetary crisis. From the banking survey, the main issue 
examined is whether banks reduce their loan supply after a monetary crisis, as expected by 
the bank lending channel hypothesis. How do they reduce loan supply, by price or non-price 
mechanisms? If they reduce their loan supply with a lag, how do they maintain their funding? 
From the firm survey, the issues examined are: what are sources of funds, and what is the 
sensitivity of demand for bank lending after a monetary tightening? Are they rationed during 
tight money periods? 
As outlined previously, the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary transmission 
depends on whether bank lending is a dominant source of external funds. The survey 
indicates that in conducting their business activities, firms use internal funds as the main 
source of financing (60.71%). Meanwhile, bank credit is still the main source of external 
funds. About 20.71% of firms use bank credit as the main source of funds. As found in many 
studies using pre-crisis data, banks are the main source of funds for at least 40% of firms’ 
financing. 
Firms using internal funds as the main source of financing rely mainly on head/business 
group (46%) and retained earnings (44%). The income from deposit interest and foreign 
exchange profits are only around 4%. Referring to the credit crunch survey, the main reasons 
for using internal funds are the relatively high loan rate, underutilization of their own capital, 
tightness of credit procedures, and the existence of bank credit rationing. 
Firms using bank loans as a main source of financing come from the manufacturing sector 
(37.9% share). Trade and property/construction each have about 20.7%, while the 
agriculture sector has only 13.8%. Classified according to business scale, the respective 
shares of bank financing are: large firms 55.2%, medium firms 41.4% and small firms only 
3.4%. The agriculture sector and small scale businesses experience difficulty obtaining bank 
credit. Obstacles to obtaining bank credit are tightness of collateral condition, declining cash 
flow, and credit rationing. 
Lending behavior after a monetary shock: The existence of the bank lending channel is 
determined by whether or not monetary policy influences loan supply. The survey indicates 
that in the case of tight money, the majority of banks (77%) will reduce their loan supply. As 
indicated by the quantitative study, foreign and joint-venture banks are less influenced by 
tight money than their domestic counterparts. The survey suggests that 50% of foreign and 
joint-venture banks will reduce their loans in the aftermath of tight money policy. Meanwhile, 
all private non-foreign exchange banks and regional banks reduce their loan supply. This 
supports previous empirical findings (eg Agung (1998)) that small banks’ reliance on deposits 
as the source of funds makes their lending more sensitive to a monetary tightening. By 
contrast, foreign banks and larger banks such as state banks and private foreign exchange 
banks that have access to non-deposit funds (eg foreign funds) are able to shield their 
lending supply from the shock. Furthermore, the banks’ holdings of securities enable them to 
protect their lending, at least in the short run. 
In the case of monetary tightening reflected in an increase in the SBI rate, banks reduce 
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tightening credit conditions, and non-price mechanisms, through reducing new loans. The 
majority of banks (71%) raise the loan rate in the aftermath of tight money and around 21.4% 
of banks reduce the loan supply. A more interesting result is that private and regional banks 
reduce lending by rationing credit rather than by raising the loan interest rate. Meanwhile, 
state banks and foreign banks raise the interest rate in order to reduce loans. A similar result 
is found in the case of monetary easing (a fall in the SBI rate); that is, around 72% of banks 
reduce loan rates and around 20% raise the loan supply. 
3.6 Expectations  channel 
As one of the channels in the monetary transmission mechanism, expected inflation plays a 
crucial role in increasing market appreciation of current and future inflation. Expected 
inflation has been developed in line with the dynamics of the economy and the availability of 
information. Monetary policy and economic development can influence the formation of 
expected inflation, which in turn will affect the behavior of economic agents. Theoretically, 
the change in behavior will be reflected in investment and consumption decisions and thus 
will influence change in aggregate demand and inflation, as well as price and wage setting. 
Considering that an economic crisis has changed inflation expectation behavior in Indonesia, 
another study (Wuryandani, et al (2001)) focuses its studies on the period after the crisis. 
Problems in data availability pose challenges in identifying the appropriate expected inflation 
proxy. Several candidates for measuring inflation expectations are tested; they include the 
inflation assumption in the government budget, VAR estimation through the Fisher equation, 
OLS and interpolated expected inflation from the business survey (SKDU) data. By using 
some statistical methods such as correlation and Granger causality, the test of those 
candidates showed that the business survey (SKDU) data is the best proxy for expected 
inflation despite its limitations as interpolated data. 
A correlation test between inflation and each candidate showed the following results: both 
SKDU and the Fisher theory showed a 92% correlation; on the other hand SEK, OLS, and 
fiscal assumptions showed lower correlations (47%, 46% and 24%, respectively). Using five 
months lag, Granger causality tests indicated that SKDU and the Fisher theory have a 
reciprocal relationship with inflation. Granger causality tests also revealed that there is no 
relationship between SEK and inflation. This might be due to the limited SEK time series 
data. Moreover, fiscal assumptions and the OLS estimation do not lead inflation at all. On the 
contrary, inflation leads both the fiscal assumption and OLS. 
With the exception of SEK data, an OLS test for each candidate series exhibit indicates that 
using those variables sufficiently explains the inflation movement which is shown by a 99% 
R-squared value of each variable. Based on the tests above, interpolated SKDU is the best 
proxy of expected inflation. 
The VAR analysis in the study concludes that in general there is monetary transmission 
through the expected inflation channel. The expected inflation itself is mainly determined by 
the exchange rate, past inflation (inertia), and the interest rate. The result confirms that 
expected inflation plays a role in inflation formation. However, it is not as strong as other 
variables such as inertia (past inflation). The significant effect of past inflation indicates that 
monetary authority credibility is a very important factor. People observe the credibility of the 
central bank and form expectations based on what they have learned. In turn, the credibility 
of the central bank will determine the effectiveness of inflation targeting. 
The analysis of impulse responses shows that a change in monetary policy will have a 
similar effect on inflation expectations and inflation. Meanwhile, the SBI rate’s strongest 
influence on expected inflation is immediate, and stabilizes in the 24th period. This indicates 
that the SBI is seen as a signal of monetary policy by the market. The effect of the SBI on 
inflation begins in the 15th period, which implies that there is a time lag of monetary policy. 
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According to the outcome of accumulated impulse responses, the initial response of 
expected inflation to an SBI shock is significant. Meanwhile, the accumulated response of 
expected inflation on inertia is more significant than on the SBI. This result reveals that the 
market is still backward-looking in forming expected inflation. The accumulated impulse 
response of the SBI shock is highly significant in the 12th period. However, the response of 
inertia is more significant than the SBI shock over the same time horizon. The lag structure 
response shows that the maximum effect of SBI and inertia on expected inflation formation is 
relatively direct for four periods. The maximum effects of SBI and inertia on inflation have a 
22 period and 18 period time lag respectively. The impulse response analysis supports the 
variance decomposition results. 
Evidence from survey 
The survey also shows that expected inflation and inflation formation are determined 
predominantly by the exchange rate, past inflation (inertia), and the interest rate. 
Nonetheless, the market response to those factors is not always symmetric. There is a 
downward rigidity in firms’ price setting, regardless of depreciation or appreciation in the 
exchange rate. On the contrary, households react asymmetrically to exchange rate 
movements. An interesting result from the survey is that the market expects inflation to 
increase as the interest rate increases. The explanation for this result is that the market 
learned in 1998 that when the interest rate increased, inflation also increased; the opposite 
occurred in 1999. In this case, the market did not take into account the time lag of monetary 
policy. In projecting future inflation, the market uses past inflation as benchmark. 
4. Conclusion 
The financial crisis of 1997 brought about significant changes in the Indonesian economy, 
including the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Before the crisis, the Indonesian 
economy was in a “boom” period with ample foreign capital flows. Under these 
circumstances, the interest rate channel worked quite well in transmitting monetary policy 
into the deposit and lending rates. Nevertheless, its effectiveness in influencing the real 
economy was inhibited by the fact that both consumption and investment were not 
responsive to changes in interest rates because of the booming economy and ample foreign 
funds. This is confirmed by the finding that did not affect bank lending prior to the crisis due 
to banks’ ability to access funds from international sources. In the meantime, the exchange 
rate channel was not very relevant before the crisis since the underlying exchange rate 
system was managed floating. As such, exchange rate movement was stable within the band 
with quite a predictable rate of depreciation, and thus did not induce significant pass-through 
effects to the real economy and prices. 
After the crisis, however, the economy and financial system have undergone structural 
changes and the country has moved to a floating exchange rate system. This undoubtedly 
has fundamental implications for the functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Exchange rate movements become more pronounced in affecting the real economy and 
prices, while the effectiveness of monetary policy to influence the exchange rate has been 
undermined by the fact that exchange rate movements have been driven more by non-
economic factors. Likewise, expectations have become more important in affecting inflation, 
but the behavior of inflation expectations has been driven mostly by price inertia and the 
exchange rate. The interest rate channel still works quite well in transmitting monetary policy, 
even though its magnitude has been affected by conditions in the banking system and overall 
higher uncertainty and risk factors. The finding is also confirmed from the bank lending 
channel, in that aggregate data show a monetary shock is able to affect bank lending with a 
lag due to the ability of banks to insulate the decrease in deposits by liquidating their 
securities holdings. Furthermore, empirical findings from disaggregated data indicate that 
bank lending is more sensitive to monetary shocks for private domestic banks, banks with 










Especially assets price, credit
and balance sheet channel
Especially Exchange rate, asset
price, interest rate and credit
Exchange 
rate
Present but not strong Strong via direct pt
The strongest channel for 
monetary transmission to core 
inflation, via direct pass-
through
No comprehensive test Present
55% variation inflation explained 
by rSBI after 15 months
59% variation in inflation 
explained by shock to SBI after 1 
year
- Indirect pt Present Present
2% variation inflation explained 
by rSBI after 25 buland, 47% 
explained by itself and 35% by 
exchange rate
Not consistent with hypothesis Not functioning well
Asset price
The strongest channel for 
monetary transmission channel 
to headline (CPI) inflation, 
especially via investment 
channel
43% variability of inflation 
explained by shock to SBI, 21% 
explained by deposit rate, and 
17% by investment growth.
Interest rate Occurred but not strong Not functioning well Functioning well especially via 
cost of capital channel
Result not consistent as rPUAB 
increased, rKI declined so the 
investment growth also 
decreased
Occurring (functioning well)
19% variation investment 
deflator explained by rPUAB, 
41% explained by itself, 26% by 
investment growth
60% variability of inflation can be 
explained by shock to SBI after 1 
year
Result not consistent: when 
rPUAB increases, rDEP 
decreases followed by positive 
consumption growth after 1 
month
Occurring (functioning) well
38% variation on consumption 
growth explained by rPUAB, 52% 
explained by itself
54% variability of inflation 






41% inflation variability explained 
by shock SBI after 1 year.
Not effective
Still backward looking (adaptive), 
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No test due to lack of data
Start functioning via 





Stronger, possibly due to 
extreme monetary contraction 
and high rupiah exchange rate 
depreciation.







1.6% consumption deflator 
explained by rPUAB after 1 
year, 91% explained by itself.
2.9% investment growth 
explained by rPUAB after 1 
year, 83% explained by itself
Before crisis
- direct pt Present
Especially exchange rate and interest rate channels
Present
8% variation inflation explained 
by rSBI after 25 months and 
around 42% each explained by 
exchange rate and tradable 
prices.




Impulse response function of inflation to shocks  
from policy rate (SBI) in the baseline model  
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Baseline Model
Interest Rate Channel - COC App.
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Correlation between the impulse response function  
of the baseline model and each channel of transmission 
 IR_Baseline  Model 
IR_Baseline model  1.000000 
IR_Credit 0.926666 
IR_Asset Price Inv  0.960693 
IR_Asset Price Cons  0.803701 
IR_Exchange rate  0.907771 
IR_Interest Rate Inv  0.927826 
IR_Interest Rate Cons  0.914049 
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